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Introduction
Bank efficiency in China has become a popular subject of research in recent years. A number of studies of Chinese banking efficiency have been published in Chinese scholarly journals 1 but to date there have been only a handful of studies that are available to non-Chinese readers 2 . The consensus of finding among Chinese scholars is that the state-owned commercial banks tend on average to exhibit the lowest levels of efficiency and the joint stock commercial banks show a faster growth in performance and efficiency.
Cost inefficiency relative to 'best practice' is usually blamed on bad management and poor motivation. Following Leibenstein (1966) this efficiency gap is termed 'X-inefficiency'. In an oft cited study of bank efficiency Berger et al (1993) argue that 20% of bank costs is due to X-inefficiency. Recent studies of bank efficiency in China have estimated cost inefficiency in the region of 50% 3 . Such figures are in stark contrast to the expectations of conventional inefficiency derived from the Berger et al (1993) study. It implies that either Chinese bank management is grossly inefficient or that the estimates of cost efficiency have failed to take into account policy objectives and/or policy constraints that enter the decision making process.
This research has three objectives. First it aims to decompose the measure of cost inefficiency in Chinese banks into technical inefficiency (sometimes viewed as X-inefficiency), and allocative inefficiency. This paper argues that while the 1 For example Qing and Ou, (2001) ; Xu, Junmin, and Zhensheng, (2001) ; Wei and Wang, (2000) ; Xue and Yang, (1998) and Zhao (2000) have used non-parametric methods while Liu and Song (2004) , Zhang, Gu and Di (2005) , Sun (2005) and Qian (2003) have used parametric methods. 2 Recent exceptions are studies using non-parametric methods by Chen et. al. (2005) , and Yao et al (2008) and parametric methods by Fu and Heffernan (2009) . Other recent studies published in English are, Lin and Zhang (2009), Berger et. al. (2009) , Fu and Heffernen (2008) , Matthews et al (2007) 3 Fu and Heffernen (2007) , Shen et al (2008) , Matthews et al (2007) underutilization of factors is consistent with the notion of X-inefficiency, but the wrong factor-mix is indicative of long-standing employment constraints imposed on the banking system in the pre-reform period. Insofar as allocative inefficiency can be explained as the result of official employment constraints, the implied cost inefficiency cannot be viewed as a management deficiency but a rational outcome of optimizing behaviour. The decomposition of cost inefficiency into X-inefficiency (technical inefficiency) and allocative inefficiency allows us to examine their evolution over the sample period.
Second, the measures of cost inefficiency and its decomposition are obtained using the familiar non-parametric method of Data-Envelopment-Analysis (DEA). The problem with the standard DEA approach is that it does not lend itself to statistical inference 4 . This paper aims to provide an inferential capability to the point-estimates of inefficiency through the use of bootstrapping methods.
Third, the bootstrap estimates of inefficiency are use to test various hypotheses regarding the levels, trends and convergence in X-inefficiency and allocative inefficiency. Over time, as the profit motive replaces other (social and economic)
imperatives the levels of X-inefficiency and allocative inefficiency should decline.
The opening up of the Chinese banking market and threat of entry of foreign banks into the Chinese market may have lead to improved management, which should result in improved technical efficiency and lower cost-inefficiency as incumbent banks attempt to cut costs and consolidate their balance sheets.
This paper is organized on the following lines. The next section provides a brief motivation and discusses the model of rational allocative inefficiency. Section 3 4 See Simar and Wilson (2008) outlines the method, reviews the literature and discusses the data. Section 4 discusses the results and section 5 concludes.
A model of rational allocative efficiency
At a first glance the Chinese banking system appears fragmented and diverse.
In Garcia-Herreo et al (2006) 8 According to La Porta, et. al (2002) , 99% of the 10 largest commercial banks were owned and under the control of the government in 1995.
officials and retirees of the People's Liberation Army who had completed their tour of duty. The overhang of Party officials and former PLA officers employed in the banks during the pre-reform period contributes to the overall picture of overstaffing.
We develop a model of allocative inefficiency based on staffing targets provided by the central authorities. Assume that the bank produces a single earnings asset (A). In reality this will consist of a combination of commercial loans, mortgages, government bonds, short-term bills, etc. We assume that this earning asset is produced by the inputs deposits (D), labour (L) and fixed capital assets ) (K 9 :
( )
The price of inputs are, the cost of deposits (r), the cost of labour (w) and the cost of fixed assets (ρ). The bank can hire two types of labour {L 1 and L 2 }. The first type (L 1 ) are bank workers who have a higher marginal product than the second type (L 2 ) who are bureaucrats. However the bank is constrained to pay the same wage to both types of workers. The objective of the bank manager is to minimise costs subject to an output target:
The bank is constrained to employ some type 2 labour but clearly in an unconstrained world the bank would only employ type 1 workers 10 .
The solution for output in the unconstrained case is given by:
9 This uses the assumption of the intermediation approach that recognises that the outputs are the interest earning assets while deposits and borrowed funds are included with capital labour as inputs. See Sealey and Lindley (1977) . 10 From the FOC of (1) the ratio of the marginal products of the two types of labour is given by ( ) ( )
Since this contradicts the assumption of type 1 labour having a higher marginal product than type 2 labour it follows that γ = 1 and L 2 = 0.
In the constrained case, the bank has to employ a certain number of type 2 labour given by the central government so that
The objective function is now:
. (4) The first order conditions are:
The marginal wage premium for type 2 labour is given by λ 2 .
The output function is now:
Denoting the input of type 1 labour in the unrestricted case as U L 1 and the same for the restricted case as R L 1 , from (5) and (3) we have the relationship described by:
The allocative inefficiency generated by the additional constraint in the restricted case
Expression (7) must be strictly greater than unity for an allocative inefficiency to exist. Because the marginal productivity of the type 2 labour is less than type 1 labour, the type 1 labour displaced by the constraint of having to employ a fixed amount of type 2 labour is less than one-for-one if the target level of output (earnings assets) is to be maintained. Figure 1 describes the situation for the case of the 2 variable inputs deposits and labour (physical capital is fixed by assumption). The isoquant is given byand the bank cost constraint by pp. The point 'e' describes the cost minimum factor composition as in the unrestricted case which uses type 1 labour only. Point R describes the constrained case which uses both types of labour. The cost inefficiency generated by the allocative inefficiency is described by the ratio OP/OR.
Figure 1 Rational Allocative Inefficiency
Substituting (6) into (7) and rearranging we have
We can show that for any values of
Qualitative evidence of overstaffing is scant and was gleaned from confidential interviews with individual bank managers. However an examination of the ratio of fixed assets to employees and deposits per employee at the beginning and end of the sample period is indicative. The average of fixed assets per employee has doubled for the big four and increased by one-third for the remainder banks over this period indicating some branch expansion but also reduction in staffing. However, because of the accounting difficulties of comparing fixed asset values over time it may be more appropriate to Having demonstrated that allocative inefficiency can be generated from rational decision making we now turn to the methodology of measuring inefficiency.
Methodology
In reality, banks are multi-output enterprises and one of the conventional ways of modelling the efficiency of banks is the non-parametric method of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which is the extension by Charnes et al. (1978) (CCR) 12 of the single input-output model of Farrell (1957) to a multiple input-output generalisation. Technical efficiency (TE) is measured as the ratio of projected output (on the efficient frontier) to actual input used. There are a number of papers that describe the methodology of DEA as applied to banking 13 , and therefore will not be elaborated here. A diagrammatic explanation illustrates the main concepts.
In figure 1, Technical efficiency is measured by the ratio OR/OQ (Technical inefficiency is given by RQ/OQ). Cost inefficiency (CI) is measured by PQ/OQ which in turn can be decomposed into X-inefficiency (or Technical inefficiency (RQ/OQ) and allocative inefficiency (PR/OQ).
DEA constructs a non-parametric frontier of the best practices amongst the decision-making units (DMUs). An efficiency score for each DMU is measured in relation to this frontier. DEA is relatively insensitive to model specification (input or output orientation) and functional form 14 ; however the results are sensitive to the choice of inputs and outputs. The weakness of the DEA approach is that it assumes data are free from measurement errors. Furthermore, since efficiency is measured in a relative way, its analysis is confined to the sample used. This means that an efficient DMU found in the analysis cannot be compared in a straightforward way with other DMUs outside of the sample.
One of the criticisms levelled at the standard DEA approach is that it produces estimates of efficiency but nothing can be said about the sensitivity (finite sample bias, confidence interval) of the estimator to sampling variation 15 . In a practical sense what this means is that if a DMU has a score of 0.95, it is 5% less efficient than the benchmark but nothing can be said about statistical significance -meaning is the 5% inefficiency statistically significant in any meaningful way. Without the capability for statistical inference, non-parametric methods would be weak alternatives to parametric methods of estimating efficiency. However, uncertainties also exist in the estimation of efficiency using DEA. The most obvious uncertainty is what comes from measurement error. Measurement error in the context of data on Chinese banks is particularly marked. There are three potential sources of error: firstly, differences between local bank's accounting procedures and those of international bodies; secondly, differences between local bank's accounting conventions; and thirdly, researcher assumptions relating to the generation of missing observations. Other uncertainties arise from the estimation of the efficiency frontier; changes to the inputs and/or outputs can cause large differences in the resulting scores. Furthermore there may be errors in the sampling variation caused by the difficulty in obtaining a sufficiently large and consistent sampling frame.
The bootstrap procedure for non-parametric frontier models is set out in Simar and Wilson (1998 , 2000a , 2000b . The efficiency scores calculated with the original data are used to construct pseudo data. The bootstrap procedure is based on the idea that there exists a Data Generating Process (DGP), which can be determined by Monte Carlo simulation. By using the estimated distribution of the DGP to generate a large number of random samples, a set of pseudo estimates of the efficiency scores i θˆ 15 Simar and Wilson (1998) are obtained. However this 'naive' bootstrap yields biased and inconsistent estimates (Simar and Wilson, 2000a Third, the gap between the two has been narrowing in recent years. 16 Recent bootstrapping applications to DEA have been conducted by Löthgren and Tambour (1999) ; in the case of banking efficiency by Casu and Molyneux (2003) ; and in the case of Chinese rural credit cooperatives, Dong and Featherstone (2006) . 17 See for example Drake and Hall (2003) , Cavallo and Rossi (2002) , Elyasiani and Rezvanian (2002) , Maudos et al. (2002) , Drake (2001) Altunbas and Molyneux (1996) and Molyneux and Forbes (1993) 18 See Rezvanian and Mehdian (2002) , Hardy and di Patti (2001) , Karim (2001) , Laevan (1999), Katib and Matthews (1999) , Chu and Lim (1998) , Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) and Fukuyama (1995) 19 In addition to the papers cited in footnote 1, other studies by Chinese scholars that have used nonparametric techniques include Fang et. al. (2004) and studies using parametric methods include , Sun (2005) , Qian (2003) , Chi, Sun and Lu (2005) , Yao, Feng and Jiang (2004) Studies of bank efficiency have used the terms technical efficiency and Xefficiency interchangeably as if they were the same thing. While similar in concept (Sealey and Lindley, 1977) , bank assets measure outputs and liabilities measure inputs. In contrast, inputs in the production approach are physical entities such as labour and physical capital and revenue flows represent outputs. In this study, we adopt a hybrid of the two approaches. We use three inputs and three outputs for the estimation of technical efficiency. Inputs are the number of employees (LAB), fixed assets (FA) and total deposits (DEP). Outputs are total loans (LOANS), other earning assets (OEA), and non-interest income (NII). Although the latter variable remains undeveloped in China, it is selected to reflect the growing contribution of non-interest income to banks' total income.
The inputs for the construction of cost-efficiency additionally require the factor prices of the relevant inputs above. We distinguish between the price of labour (PL), price of fixed capital (PK) and the price of funds (PF). The price of labour is obtained as the ratio of personnel expenses to the number of employees. The price of fixed capital is obtained as operating expenses less personnel expenses divided by fixed assets (less depreciation). The price of funds is obtained from the ratio of interest paid to total funds. Table 2 Other points to note are that net employment has grown by an average of 0.6% a year but average labour cost has grown by a remarkable 14% a year, reflecting the increasing skill premium paid to workers in this sector. A further point to note is reduced relative dispersion of the variables (coefficient of variation) which also indicates an increased convergence of the nationwide banks on each other.
Having outlined the methodology and the data we now examine the empirical results from the bootstrap method.
Empirical Results
Tables 3a We now turn to the third objective of this paper and that is to evaluate the levels, tends and convergence in the two types of inefficiency. Table 4 shows the full period sample means and weighted means of the cost inefficiency (CI) and Xinefficiency (XI) estimates obtained as CI = (1 -CE) and XI = (1 -XE) respectively.
The allocative inefficiency estimate was obtained as the residual of the cost inefficiency CI and X-inefficiency XI (AI = CI -XI) 22 . Weighting the inefficiency scores provide a more accurate picture of the average levels of inefficiency but in reality the difference between the pure average and the weighted average is of second-order magnitude. It can be seen from Table 4 that the weighted average cost inefficiency over the period for the SOCBs is slightly smaller than the average for the JSCBs. The table also indicates that the weighted average allocative inefficiency is comparable for both groups of banks.
21 Out of 154 bootstrap results for each bank-year in only seven cases was the bias correction invalid. In such cases the bootstrap value was used for consistency. 22 Strictly AE = CE/XE but as we are dealing with the median values of an unknown distribution it was convenient to define AI = CI-XI = XE-CE. The alternative measure is AI
Using the mean of the un-weighted scores, we test if there is a significant difference between the average inefficiency of banks that have a foreign stakeholding from those that do not. Since the distribution of the inefficiency scores may not be standard normal we apply a non-parametric test (Mann-Whitney) with the results shown in Table 5 . Using the concept of beta-convergence from the growth convergence literature (Barro, 1991) , we can obtain a measure of the speed of convergence to a common level of inefficiency by regressing the change in the level of inefficiency on the lag of inefficiency and environmental and bank specific variables to allow for convergence to different levels of inefficiency 24 . However it is shown by Simar and Wilson (2007) that the estimated inefficiencies may be serially correlated. They propose a double bootstrap procedure to adjust for the bias caused by the inherent correlation among the estimated inefficiencies. The problem of potential bias is further compounded by the existence of the lagged inefficiency score. Developing a valid bootstrap procedure for estimating beta-convergence is computationally intractable. However in an attempt to deal with the potential serial correlation we present estimates of the rate of decline of inefficiency controlled for individual bank factors using a panel GLS
Heteroskedastic-Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) estimator (Table 6 ). The dependant variable was the yearly change in the specific type of inefficiency. Bank specific variables were lagged one period to avoid potential endogeneity.
24 See also Fung (2006) χ 100.2*** 100.2*** 100.2*** 22.0* 21.7* 21.6* *** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10%.
The key covariate is the lag in the level of inefficiency. A negative coefficient defines the common speed of convergence of inefficiency. The bank specific variable that proved significant was the logarithm of total assets as a measure of size.
Environmental variables were a zero-one dummy variable identifying SOCBs (SOB) and the proportion of the bank owned by foreign financial enterprises (FOR). An interaction term between the lag in inefficiency and the SOB dummy defined differing speed of adjustment between SOCBs and JSCBs. The third but last row is the log likelihood. The second but last row is an F test for autocorrelation in panel data (Wooldridge, 2002) and the final row is a likelihood ratio test for heteroskedasticity in panel data.
The last two rows of Table 6 indicate that the use of the HAC estimator was appropriate. Autocorrelation in the panel could not be rejected at the 1% level for the regressions of both types of inefficiency, and heteroskedasticity could not be rejected at the 1% for the X-inefficiency and 10% for allocative inefficiency regressions.
The results of Table 6 indicate that controlling for ownership, larger banks are associated with lower levels of both types of inefficiency. Banks that have a foreign stake are associated with lower levels of both types of inefficiency, confirming the finding reported in Table 4 . State-owned banks are associated with higher levels of both types of inefficiency and in particular higher levels of allocative inefficiency.
Importantly, the negative coefficient on the lagged measure of inefficiency shows significant decline in both measures of inefficiency. The interaction term of lagged inefficiency with SOB suggests that the state-owned banks reduce inefficiency at a lower speed than the JSCBs 25 , but that they are reducing both types at roughly the same speed. The results suggest that the joint-stock commercial banks are reducing allocative inefficiency at a faster rate than X-inefficiency.
Conclusion
This paper has used non-parametric methods to conduct an analysis of inefficiency in a sample of Chinese banks. The estimates of bank inefficiency were obtained using a bootstrapping method to enable statistical inference. We have partitioned cost inefficiency into X-inefficiency and allocative inefficiency. Our findings suggest that Chinese banks have been improving performance by reducing both types of inefficiency. However, the state-owned banking sector has higher levels of both types of inefficiency and is also reducing both types of inefficiency at a slower rate than joint-stock commercial banks. This suggests that state-owned banks are more constrained by social and political objectives in their downsizing strategy than JSCBs.
We confirm the findings from nonparametric and stochastic frontier based studies of Chinese banks that average cost inefficiency are in the region of 50%.
Inefficiency in Chinese banking is made up of both X-inefficiency and allocative inefficiency. We have argued in this paper that given the social and political constraints that Chinese banks had to operate in, allocative inefficiency was symptomatic of rational decision making dictated by social employment objectives.
However, we must still interpret the results with caution. Not all of allocative inefficiency can be attributed to over-staffing and not all of over-staffing can be explained by past employment objectives. Overstaffing caused by political and social constraints is observationally equivalent to rent-seeking behaviour by bank managers (Matthews et al, 2007) . It is also possible that poor management decisions that may have contributed to X-inefficiency could also have contributed to allocative inefficiency.
Yet, the argument of this paper is that there have been significant improvements in bank efficiency. The 2007 weighted average of all banks Xinefficiency and allocative inefficiency is 16% and 20% respectively. If the Berger et al (1993) finding that 20% of all bank costs are due to X-efficiency represents a common benchmark for banking markets in general then the message of this paper is that Chinese banks are not out of line.
The heterogeneous bootstrap algorithm
In this paper, we implement the heterogeneous bootstrap algorithm of Simar and Wilson (2000b) to compute the bias-corrected technical efficiency and cost efficiency scores. Specifically, we follow the following steps: Note: In our application 3 , 3 , 14 = = = q p n . Step 1. Compute the technical efficiency scores using the original data. To be consistent with Simar and Wilson (2000b) , we denote these technical efficiency estimates by ( )
. The i δˆs are computed using the linear programming described in equation (17) of Simar and Wilson (2000) . Note that by definition,
Step 2. Step 3. 
Step 4. Choose an appropriate bandwidth as suggested by Simar and Wilson (2000) . We use the normal reference rule for its simplicity. This choice was also supported by Simar and Wilson's (2000b) simulation study.
Step 5. Draw n rows with replacement from Z to form a new Step 7 Step 10. Step 12. Compute the bias-corrected estimates of technical efficiency and cost efficiency, and bootstrap confidence intervals.
